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Abstract
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising approach
to achieve fine-grained access control over the outsourced data in Internet of
Things (IoT). However, in the existing CP-ABE schemes, the access policy is
either appended to the ciphertext explicitly or only partially hidden against pub-
lic visibility, which results in privacy leakage of the underlying ciphertext and
potential recipients. In this paper, we propose a fine-grained data access control
scheme supporting expressive access policy with fully attribute hidden for cloud-
based IoT. Specifically, the attribute information is fully hidden in access policy
by using randomizable technique, and a fuzzy attribute positioning mechanism
based on garbled Bloom filter is developed to help the authorized recipients
locate their attributes efficiently and decrypt the ciphertext successfully. Secu-
rity analysis and performance evaluation demonstrate that the proposed scheme
achieves effective policy privacy preservation with low storage and computation
overhead. As a result, no valuable attribute information in the access policy
will be disclosed to the unauthorized recipients.
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Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical “things”, such as smart
phones, sensors, and wearable devices, that enables these things to connect
and exchange data, creating opportunities to improve our daily lives in different
domains including electronic healthcare, smart home and transportation [1, 2, 3].5
Almost 50 billion IoT devices will be connected together by 2020 [4], and they
will continuously produce large amounts of data which should be stored and
processed in a well-organized way. In such situation, the traditional local data
management is not scalable for large data volume [5]. The cloud computing
technology, which provides plentiful storage and computation resources, has10
been widely used to maintain and manage these IoT-driven data[6, 7].
However, the data owners lose the physical control over their data after
outsourcing them to the cloud [8]. The frequent data leakage incidents [9, 10, 11]
undermine trust in the cloud service provider, which make data privacy and
security be a serious concern for data owners [12, 13]. Although traditional15
encryption technology can be used to protect data confidentiality, it is relatively
inefficient to serve the needs of flexible data sharing. Thus, the novel attribute-
based encryption (ABE) [14] is applied to achieve fine-grained access control
and preserve data confidentiality simultaneously. Especially, ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [15] enables the data owners to encrypt20
their data under specified access policy over a set of attributes, and the data
recipients are allowed to decrypt the ciphertext only if their attributes satisfy
the access policy associated with the ciphertext. However, in the conventional
CP-ABE schemes [15, 16], the access policy is explicitly appended to the data
ciphertext, thus anyone who obtains the ciphertext, including the cloud service25
provider, may be able to infer some secret information about the data content or
the privileged data recipients from the policy. For example, to share the medical
records with the doctors or nurses in the Cardiology Department of Hospital A or













OR “Nurse”)] AND [Department: (“Cardiology”)] AND [Hospital: (“A” OR30
“B”)]}, and uploads the encrypted data including the policy explicitly to the
cloud server. In such situation, anyone who obtains the ciphertext infers that
the data owner may suffer from a heart problem, although they do not obtain the
plaintext. Even worse, the cloud service provider may conclude that the users
who request these data regularly are working at the Cardiology Department of35
Hospital A or B. Obviously, such information disclosures are not expected by
both the data owners and recipients, which makes it necessary to preserve the
privacy of access policy in certain applications, just like this sensitive electronic
healthcare system.
To solve the privacy leakage problem caused by the public access policy, a40
direct solution is to hide the attribute information in the policy. However, the
simple approach makes the decryption infeasible for the authorized recipients,
since they do not know which attributes should be used for decryption. Some
proposed schemes [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] consider a trade-off between the policy
privacy and the feasibility, in which the attribute is split into two parts: name45
and value. Instead of hiding the whole attribute, only the attribute value is
concealed in the access policy. Though these schemes can protect the policy
privacy to some extent, the attribute name itself could still reveal some valuable
information. On the other hand, inner-product predicate encryption (IPE) [23]
can be applied to construct a CP-ABE scheme with fully hidden policy, but the50
blow up in size caused by the access structure transformation makes it extremely
inefficient [21].
Recently, Yang et al. [24] put forward an innovative idea of removing the
attribute mapping function ρ from the access policy (M,ρ), which is in the form
of linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS). Without sending ρ directly, they utilize55
a Bloom filter structure [25, 26] to help the recipients to locate their attributes
to the access matrix M precisely. However, their scheme is not secure against
the dictionary attacks, which means anyone can query any attribute from the
Bloom filter to confirm whether it is in the access policy, and further recover













In this paper, we handle the above issue of policy privacy preservation by
hiding the whole attribute. Based on the observation in [24], since the attribute
mapping function ρ reveals the relationship between the row and attribute in
the expressive LSSS-based access policy (M,ρ), removing it can effectively hide
the attribute information. However, how to recover the relationship between65
their attributes and the access matrix M for the authorized recipients, while re-
sisting dictionary attacks, is a challenging problem. In our scheme, we propose
a fuzzy attribute positioning mechanism based on garbled Bloom filter to help
the recipients query the row numbers for their attributes, in which only autho-
rized recipients are allowed to verify the validity of the results through successful70
decryption, while for unauthorized recipients no valuable attribute privacy can
be compromised. Thus, we can realize fine-grained data access control on the
outsourced data, and protect both data confidentiality and policy privacy.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
1. We propose a fine-grained attribute-based data access control scheme75
with attribute-hiding policy for cloud-based IoT. Different from existing
schemes, our scheme supports expressive access policy and the attribute
information is fully hidden.
2. We design a fuzzy attribute positioning mechanism based on garbled
Bloom filter to assist the authorized recipients to locate the attributes80
effectively and decrypt the ciphertext successfully, and prevent the unau-
thorized recipients deducing any valuable attribute information from the
ciphertext.
3. We analyze the security and efficiency of our proposed scheme, and the fur-
ther simulations demonstrate that the scheme can achieve effective policy85
privacy preservation with low storage and computation overhead.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first introduce some
related work in Section 2 and review several preliminary concepts in Section
3. The system model, security model and design goals are presented in Section













Finally, we analyze the security and evaluate the performance in Section 6 and
give the conclusion in Section 7.
2. Related work
The notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first introduced by Sa-
hai and Waters [14], which later develops into two forms: ciphertext-policy ABE95
(CP-ABE) [15] and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [27]. Since CP-ABE enables the
data owners to specify fine-grained access policy for their data, it soon became
popular in the outsourced data access control systems. In a CP-ABE system,
the data owners encrypt the data under the access policy on the system at-
tribute universe, and the data recipients request the secret key associated with100
their attributes from the attribute authority. If and only if the access policy of
the ciphertext is satisfied by the recipient’s attribute set, can it be decrypted
successfully. Generally, according to the expression form, the access policy is
divided into three categories: AND-based [17], tree-based [27] and LSSS-based
[15]. The AND-based policy is limited in expressiveness and the tree-based pol-105
icy is a more expressive one that supports the gates of AND, OR, and m of n
threshold. In addition, an LSSS-based access policy is often considered as the
most expressive representation, since any monotonic boolean formula can be
converted into this type[15].
Currently, many ABE schemes with some new promising functionalities110
which make them more practical have been proposed, such as revocable ABE
[28], lightweight ABE [29], outsourcing ABE [30] and large universe ABE [16].
However, most of the schemes expose the access policy in clear text, which may
incur privacy leakage, thus the research on anonymity of ABE is also necessary.
In an anonymous ABE, the access policy is hidden such that the unauthorized115
recipients cannot presume what access policy is formulated by the data own-
ers. The concept of partially hidden access policy was introduced into ABE
by Nishide et al. [17] to achieve anonymity, in which the attribute is split into













are concealed. Based on the scheme in [17], some works [18, 19, 20] improved120
the construction in terms of efficiency and security, but they are still restricted
with the less expressive AND-based access policy. Later, Lai et al. [21] put
forward an anonymous CP-ABE scheme in the composite order groups, which
partially hides the LSSS-based access policy. With the same form of the access
policy, Cui et al. [22, 31] proposed a more efficient scheme in the prime order125
groups on the basis of the large universe construction in [16], where opportunis-
tic decryption tests are required for the authorized recipients. It might also be
noted that all the above schemes focus on the partially hidden access policy,
but the public attribute names may also lead to the issue of privacy leakage.
Some other schemes [23, 32] based on the inner-product predicate encryption130
and hidden vector encryption are proposed to protect the policy privacy, but
the efficiency and expressiveness are restricted. Table 1 shows the comparisons
of some existing schemes in CP-ABE to preserve the policy privacy.
Table 1: Comparisons of CP-ABE schemes with policy hidden
Schemes Policy Hidden Access Policy Group Order Decryption Test
Basic CP-ABE [15] no LSSS prime N/A
Nishide et al. [17] yes (disclosed attribute name) AND gates with multi-values prime deterministic1
Li et al. [18] yes (disclosed attribute name) AND gates with multi-values prime deterministic
Lai et al. [19] yes (disclosed attribute name) AND gates with multi-values composite deterministic
Zhang et al. [20] yes (disclosed attribute name) AND gates with multi-values prime deterministic
Lai et al. [21] yes (disclosed attribute name) LSSS with multi-values composite opportunistic2
Cui et al. [22] yes (disclosed attribute name) LSSS with multi-values prime opportunistic
Michalevsky et al. [23] yes (whole policy hidden) Inner product predicates prime opportunistic
Khan et al. [32] yes (whole policy hidden) LSSS with hidden vectors prime opportunistic
Yang et al. [24] no LSSS prime N/A
Ours yes (whole attribute hidden) LSSS prime opportunistic
1 “deterministic” means that the number of decryption test is fixed, usually is one.
2 “opportunistic” means that multiple tests may be required before finding the attributes for
successful decryption.
Recently, Yang et al. [24] proposed a creative scheme to fully hide the













access policy, but their scheme is vulnerable against the dictionary attacks. In
their scheme, anyone is allowed to query any attribute from the attribute Bloom
filter to reveal whether it is in the access matrix and further recover the whole
access policy through multiple tests. To resist this dictionary attack, we design
a fuzzy attribute positioning mechanism, in which only authorized recipients140
can obtain the attribute information by successful decryption.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we review some technical preliminaries related to our work.
3.1. Access Structure
Definition 1. (Access Structure [16]) An access structure on an attribute uni-145
verse U is a collection A of non-empty sets of attributes. The sets in A are called
the authorized sets. In addition, an access structure which satisfies the following
requirement is called monotone: if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A.
In the CP-ABE scheme, only the user who has an authorized attribute set is
allowed to decrypt the ciphertext. In this paper, we only consider the monotone150
access structure, and the concept of access structure is also referred to as access
policy in our context.
3.2. Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
We apply the linear secret sharing scheme to represent the access policy in
our scheme.155
Definition 2. (LSSS [16]) Let p be a prime. A linear secret sharing scheme
∏
with a secret in Zp according to the access policy over an attribute universe U
is called linear if:














2. For an access policy over U , there exist an l× n share-generating matrix,
and an attribute mapping function ρ labeling each row in M with an at-
tribute in U , which satisfy that:
With a column vector ~z = (s, z2, z3, . . . , zn), where z2, z3, . . . , zn are ran-
dom values in Zp, M~z is the vector formed by the l shares of the secret s165
based on
∏
, and (M~z)j is the share assigned to the attribute ρ(j). The
pair of (M,ρ) is referred to as access policy.
The linear secret sharing scheme satisfies reconstruction and security re-
quirements. Specifically, if S is an authorized set for the policy (M,ρ), there
exist constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that
∑
i∈I(ωiMi) = (1, 0, . . . , 0), where I170
denotes the set of rows for which the corresponding attributes belong to S, i.e.
I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S ∩ i ∈ [l]1}. Obviously, the secret s can be recovered through
∑
i∈I(ωiλi) = s. However, no such constant exists for any unauthorized set.
3.3. Bloom Filter
Bloom filter [25] is a space-efficient data structure for probabilistic set mem-175
bership querying. A Bloom filter includes an m-bit array to encode a set A
including at most n elements, and a set of independent hash functions H, where
each hi ∈ H maps an element to a position index in [m] uniformly. In general,
(m,n, k,H)-BF is used to represent a Bloom filter with parameters (m,n, k,H),
BFA denotes a Bloom filter encoding the set A, and BFA[i] denotes the value180
in the ith position of BFA.
At first, each bit in the array is 0. To add an element x ∈ A to the filter,
x is hashed by k hash functions respectively to generate k position indexes.
Then, for each i ∈ [k], set BFA[hi(x)] = 1. To query whether an element y
belongs to the set A, y is also hashed by the hash functions, and if there exists185
BFA[hj(y)] = 0, then y /∈ A. Otherwise, y ∈ A with a high probability. A false
positive exists in the Bloom filter, which means it is possible that y /∈ A but all
1For simplicity, in our context we define [n]
def.













BFA[hj(y)] equal to 1. Given the size of A, the probability of false positive can
be adequately small by selecting m and k optimally.
The garbled Bloom filter is proposed by Dong et al. [26] to deal with the190
issue of private set intersection. Instead of using an array of bits, an array of η-
bit strings is applied in the garbled Bloom filter. To add an element x ∈ A to the
filter, it is split into k shares which will be stored at the positions {hi(x)}i∈[k].
To query an element y, if the value recovered from the shares of the k positions
{hi(y)}i∈[k] is equal to y, then y ∈ A, otherwise y is not in A.195
4. System Model and Design Goals
4.1. System Model
Four entities are included in our system, namely data owners, data recipients,
attribute authority and cloud server, as shown in Fig. 1.
Cloud Server






Figure 1: System model
• Data owners To save the local storage and computing cost, the data200
owners would like to outsource the data generated by the IoT devices
to the cloud. Meanwhile, fine-grained access control over the outsourced
data is desired by the owners, thus they will use the CP-ABE scheme to
encrypt the data before uploading them to the cloud.
• Data recipients The data recipients originate data requests to the cloud205













attributes that satisfy the access policy of the data, can decrypt the ci-
phertext successfully. While for unauthorized recipients, they can neither
recover the plaintext, nor guess the attributes involved in the access policy.
• Attribute authority The attribute authority manages the system at-210
tribute universe and distributes the attributes and corresponding private
keys to the recipients according to their roles or credentials. In addition,
the system public key is also generated and published by the attribute
authority.
• Cloud server The cloud server is considered to have powerful storage215
and computing resources and is always online to provide services. It helps
the data owners store and process their data, responses the requests from
the recipients, and distributes the corresponding data to them. Note that,
in our system, the data access control is embedded into the decryption,
but not implemented by the cloud server.220
4.2. Security Model
In our system, the attribute authority is regarded as a entirely credible party
and the data owners are honest as well. Since the cloud server is in different trust
domain with the data owners, it is assumed to be semi-honest, which means it is
interested in the data privacy and is not reliable to make the access decisions of225
the data, but will execute the operations requested by the system users faithfully.
The recipients are divided into two kinds: authorized and unauthorized. The
authorized recipients are allowed to obtain the data content, and we assume that
they will not leak the data information actively. The unauthorized recipients
are the potential attackers of the system. They may collude with each other to230
attempt to decrypt the ciphertext which cannot be accessed individually, also
they are interested in the policy privacy of the ciphertext.
Note that, the dictionary attack is considered in our scheme, which means













cloud server, may conspire to compromise the hidden attribute information of235
the access policy by testing all the system attributes.
4.3. Design Goals
Considering the requirement mentioned in the system and security model,
our goal is to design a fine-grained and privacy preserving data access control
scheme supporting expressive access policy with fully hidden attributes. Con-240
cretely, the following goals should be fulfilled.
• Fine-grained access control. The recipients whose attributes satisfy the
access policy can decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the data content, while
those unauthorized recipients cannot even through colluding.
• Privacy preservation of expressive policy. The expressive LSSS-based ac-245
cess policy should be supported. Meanwhile, the unauthorized recipients,
include the cloud server, cannot compromise the attribute privacy of the
access policy.
• Practical implementation. The underlying system operations, such as en-
cryption and decryption, should be completed by the corresponding enti-250
ties effectively and efficiently.
5. Our Proposed Scheme
In this section, we first give an overview of the proposed scheme, and then
describe the construction in detail of four phases: 1) system setup; 2) key gen-
eration; 3) data encryption, and 4) data decryption. Our construction is on the255
basis of the CP-ABE scheme in [15], and the idea of the attribute-hiding policy
can also be used in other ABE schemes with LSSS-based access policy. Table 2
presents some notations used in our scheme.
5.1. Scheme Overview
We propose a fine-grained and privacy preserving data access control scheme260













Table 2: Notations used in our scheme
Notations Descriptions
PK,MSK system public key and master secret key
U = {att1, . . . , att|U |} system attribute universe
hattx public key components for attribute attx in U
S = {att∗j} attribute set of the data recipient, S ⊂ U
SKS secret key associated with attribute set S
M an l × n matrix in the access policy
ρ an attribute mapping function in the access policy
msg data file to be uploaded
CT final ciphertext uploaded to the cloud
(m,n, k,H, η)-T attribute Bloom filter T with parameters (m,n, k,H, η)
Θ a mapping function from attribute set S to a set of rows J ⊆ [l]
MJ a submatrix of M including the rows belonging to J
I
a set of minimum subsets of J such that
for each I∈I there exists ∑i∈I wiMi = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
IoT. In our scheme, we apply the basic CP-ABE primitive to achieve flexible
access control, and remove the attribute mapping function ρ from the access pol-
icy (M,ρ) to hide the attribute information. To help the authorized recipients
locate their attributes to the access matrix, a fuzzy attribute positioning mech-265
anism is designed based on a modified garbled Bloom filter, which is referred to
as attribute Bloom filter in our context.
As shown in Table 3, to add an attribute attx to the original garbled Bloom
filter [26], the value attx itself is inserted. While in [24], a unique value rownumx||attx
associated with the attribute attx is inserted, where rownumx is used to help270
the recipients to precisely recover the corresponding row number in the ac-
cess matrix M of attribute attx. However, since the attribute universe U may
be public, anyone including the cloud server can launch the dictionary attack,
which means they are able to query any attribute from the filter to make sure
whether it is in the access policy, thus the attribute privacy is still revealed.275













binding with the corresponding row number is inserted in our scheme. When
the recipients look up the filter, a correct row number can be recovered for those
attributes belonging to the policy, but a random row number for others. In ad-
dition, only authorized recipients can verify the validity of the row numbers for280
the attributes through successful decryption, thus the attribute privacy can be
preserved effectively.
Table 3: Comparisons of value inserting
Schemes Added attribute Inserted value
Dong et al. [26] attx attx
Yang et al. [24] attx rownumx||attx
Ours attx ξl + rownumx
Generally, the following four algorithms are included in our scheme.
• Setup(U) → (PK,MSK) This algorithm takes as input the attribute
universe U , and outputs the public key PK and the system master secret285
key MSK.
• KeyGen(PK,MSK,S) → SKS This algorithm takes as input PK,
MSK and a attribute set S, and generates the secret key SKS associ-
ated with S.
• Encrypt(PK,msg, (M,ρ)) → CT This algorithm takes as input PK,290
a message msg and an access policy (M,ρ), and outputs the ciphertext
CT , where only M is included in the ciphertext. More specifically, two
functions are included in the Encrypt algorithm: CTGen and ABFBuild.
– CTGen: This function encrypts the data under the access policy,
which can be seen as the encryption algorithm in the basic CP-ABE295
scheme.
– ABFBuild: This function constructs an attribute Bloom filter to













• Decrypt(CT, SKS) → msg/⊥ This algorithm takes as input the cipher-
text CT and SKS associated with S, and returns the message msg if the300
attribute set S satisfies the access policy embedded in CT . Otherwise, it
returns ⊥ with a overwhelming probability. It contains three functions:
ABFQuery, MapRecover and DecTest.
– ABFQuery: This function is used to query a row number from the
attribute Bloom filter for each attribute in the recipient’s attribute305
set.
– MapRecover: This function helps to recover a set of the possible
attribute mapping functions.
– DecTest: This function is designed to test whether the Decrypt al-
gorithm is successful, and returns the final result.310
5.2. Scheme Description
5.2.1. System Setup
The attribute authority first executes the Setup algorithm with the input of
the attribute universe U = {att1, . . . , att|U |}. Let G and GT be multiplicative
cyclic groups of prime order p, g be a generator of G, and e : G × G → GT be315
a bilinear map. The attribute authority randomly chooses α, β ∈ Z∗p and group
elements hatt1 , . . . , hatt|U| ∈ G for all the attributes in U . The public key PK
is published as
PK = 〈e(g, g)α, g, gβ , hatt1 , . . . , hatt|U|〉
The attribute authority sets MSK = gα as the system master secret key.320
5.2.2. Key Generation
When the data recipient joins the system, the authority will assign an at-
tribute set S ⊂ U to him according to his roles or credentials, and run the














This algorithm takes as input PK, MSK and an attribute set S. It chooses
a random number t ∈ Z∗p , and computes
D = gαgβt, D′ = gt, ∀attx ∈ S Dattx = htattx
Finally, the secret key is distributed to the recipient as
SKS = 〈S,D,D′, {Dattx}attx∈S〉
5.2.3. Data Encryption
To achieve data confidentiality and fine-grained access control simultane-
ously, the data owner first specifies an access policy (M,ρ) over U for the data
msg. Then, it executes the Encrypt(PK,msg, (M,ρ)) algorithm to produce the
ciphertext CT which will be uploaded to the cloud server.330
The Encrypt algorithm in our scheme includes two functions: CTGen and
ABFBuild. The function CTGen is used to produce the real ciphertext compo-
nents and the function ABFBuild is designed to help the recipients locate their
attributes to the access matrix M . Note that the second one is indispensable
since the attribute mapping function ρ is removed from the final ciphertext CT335
to prevent the disclosure of attribute privacy in the access policy.
1. CTGen(PK,msg, (M,ρ))→ CT0
The function takes as input the public key PK, the data msg and the access
policy (M,ρ), where M is an l × n access matrix and ρ is an injective function
that maps each row in M to a unique attribute in U . It first selects random
numbers s, z2, . . . , zn ∈ Zp, and constructs a vector ~z = (s, z2, . . . , zn). It cal-
culates λi = Mi · ~z for each i ∈ [l], where Mi means the ith row of M . Here λi
can be seen as the secret share that is assigned to the attribute ρ(i). Then the
ciphertext CT0 is produced as
CT0 = 〈C = msg · e(g, g)αs, C0 = gs, {Ci = gaλih−sρ(i)}i∈[l]〉
Remarks. In order to allow the recipient to test whether the decryption
succeeds, we can adopt the technique introduced in [33], in which two in-













a randomly selected value key ∈ GT . Then key is encrypted by running
CTGen(PK, key, (M,ρ)) = CT0. In addition, the data msg is encrypted un-
der key1 with the symmetric encryption SEkey1(msg). Finally, the ciphertext is
in the form CT ′ = (CT0, key2,SEkey1(msg)). After decrypting key from CT0,
the recipient first uses key2 in CT
′ to verify whether key is decrypted success-345
fully, where the false positive probability (approximately 1/2δ) can be ignored
with a long enough δ. If successful, the recipient can decrypt msg from the
symmetric ciphertext SEkey1(msg) through key1 derived from key.
2. ABFBuild(M,ρ)→ T
The function first defines the parameters (m,n, k,H, η) of the attribute350
Bloom filter T , where m means the size of the filter, n is the number of at-
tributes to be added, k means the number of the hash functions in H, and η
represents the bit length of the inserted value. In our scheme, n is set as the
number of rows in M , which also means the number of attributes in the policy.
Then, m and k can be selected optimally according to n, η should be longer355
than the bit length of l, and H = {hj}j∈[k] are k independent hash functions
that hash each attribute to [m] uniformly.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
m=10
k=3
Figure 2: Example of inserting values into the attribute Bloom filter
To add an attribute ρ(i) to the filter, a unique value vi = ξil+ i binding with
the row number i will be inserted, where ξi is a random number and vi < 2
η.
More specifically, vi is split into k shares {rji }j∈[k] with the (k, k) secret sharing360
scheme based on XOR operations [34], and the share rji is put at the position
hj(ρ(i)). The k shares of vi are computed as follows: it first chooses k−1 random
number r1i , r
2
i , . . . , r
k−1

















Note that during the inserting process, some location pos = hj(ρ(i)) could
have been occupied by a previous inserted value. In such a case, the existing365
T [pos] will not be overwritten, which means rji is set as T [pos] and used to
compute the final share. For example, as shown in Fig. 2, a value v1 is inserted
into the filter first, and the corresponding positions 2, 4, 7 have be filled with
the shares of v1. Then for the value v2, position 4 have already be occupied by
the share r21 of v1. So in order to guarantee that the previous inserted value370
v1 can be recovered, r
2
1 will be reused, which means that instead of randomly
choosing a new share, we set r12 = r
2
1. Following Function 1 shows the detailed
implement process of ABFBuild.
Remarks. Note that the false positive error leads to an empty value of
the variable EmptyPos after the inner loop (line 9-22), which will cause an375
illegal index position of the attribute Bloom filter T in line 23. In such a
situation, the ABFBuild function will be failed and the encryption process will
be interrupted, so it will not degrade the security of our scheme. In addition, as




m ) + 1), where p = 1− (1− 1/m)(n−1)k, which can be ignored380
with optimally selected m and k. Different from [24], our scheme enables the
data owners to select the parameters of the attribute Bloom filter, such that
even if the false positive error occurs, the ABFBuild function can be efficiently
re-executed with new parameters (less than 5ms for 50 attributes). Thus, the
effects on the efficiency of the proposed scheme caused by false positive property385
is limited and acceptable.
After calling the two functions, the data owner uploads the final ciphertext
CT = 〈M,CT ′, (m,n, k,H, η)-T 〉 to the cloud server.
5.2.4. Data Decryption
The recipients are allowed to download the ciphertext from the cloud server390
depending on their interests. When they obtain the ciphertext CT , they can
run the Decrypt(CT, SKS) algorithm to recover the plaintext, if their attribute















Output: (m,n, k,H, η)-T
1: n = l, Select m, k,H, η optimally
2: T= new m-element array of η-bit strings
3: for i = 1 to m do
4: T [i] = null
5: end for
6: for i = 1 to l do
7: Select a random number ξi, such that ξil + i < 2
η
8: EmptyPos = 0, FinalShare = ξil + i
9: for j = 1 to k do
10: pos = hj(ρ(i))
11: if T [pos] == null then
12: if EmptyPos == 0 then
13: EmptyPos = pos
14: else
15: Select a random number v from {0, 1}η
16: T [pos] = v
17: FinalShare = FinalShare⊕ T [pos]
18: end if
19: else
20: FinalShare = FinalShare⊕ T [pos]
21: end if
22: end for
23: T [EmptyPos] = FinalShare
24: end for
25: for i = 1 to m do
26: if T [i] == null then
27: Select a random number v from {0, 1}η
28: T [i] = v
29: end if












three functions: ABFQuery, MapRecover and DecTest. The first function is
used to query a row number for each attribute in S, the second one is to recover395
a set of possible attribute mapping functions, and the last one is to test whether
the decryption succeeds.
1. ABFQuery(S, T )→ Θ
The function takes as input the attribute set S and the attribute Bloom
filter T , where the parameters of T are include implicitly. For each attribute400
attx ∈ S, it first computes the k positions {hj(attx)}j∈[k] and obtains the shares
{rjx = T [hj(x)]}j∈[k]. Then the corresponding row number of the attribute attx
is calculated as rownumx = (r
1
x⊕r2x⊕· · ·⊕rkx) mod l. As shown in Function 2,
a mapping function Θ : S → J from the attribute set S to a set of rows J ⊆ [l]
will be generated after calling the ABFQuery function.405
Remarks. Note that for those attributes existed in the access policy, the
row numbers recovered from T are valuable, but for others are just random
numbers in [l]. In addition, it is possible that some different attributes may
recover the same row number, and the possibility is influenced by the number
of attributes in the attribute set and access policy.410
After generating Θ, the Decrypt algorithm calls the following MapRecover
function.
2. MapRecover(Θ)→ P
This function takes as input Θ, and produces a set of attribute mapping
functions P by choosing only one attribute for each row in J , such that each415
ρ̃ ∈ P is an injective function which maps J to an attribute set S̃ ⊆ S. As
shown in Function 3, it first generates the attributes associated with each row
in J and calculates the total number of the mapping functions in P (line 1-5).
Then for each ρ̃i, it chooses only one attribute for each row in J to compose an
attribute set S̃i, with the condition that i 6= j ⇒ S̃i 6= S̃j (line 8-15). Finally, it420
adds all ρ̃i to the set P (line 16).
At last, for each ρ̃i ∈ P and corresponding secret key SKS̃i ⊆ SKS , the















Output: Θ : S → J
1: J = ∅, Θ = ∅
2: for attx ∈ S do
3: temp = 0
4: for j = 1 to k do
5: pos = hj(attx)
6: temp = temp⊕ T [pos]
7: end for
8: rownumx = temp mod l
9: if rownumx == 0 then
10: rownumx = l
11: end if
12: if rownumx /∈ J then
13: add rownumx into J
14: end if















Input: Θ : S → J
Output: P
1: Num = 1
2: for each rownum ∈ J do
3: attsrownum = Θ
−1(rownum)
4: Num = Num ∗ length(attsrownum)
5: end for
6: for i = 0 to (Num− 1) do
7: step = Num, ρ̃i = ∅, S̃i = ∅
8: for each rownum ∈ J do
9: len = length(attsrownum)
10: step = step/len
11: attIndex = (i/step) mod len
12: att = attsrownum[attIndex]
13: Add att to S̃i
14: Add rownum→ att into ρ̃i : J → S̃i
15: end for














msg, then the decryption completes successfully. Otherwise, the Decrypt algo-
rithm outputs ⊥, which represents that the recipient’s attributes do not satisfy425
the access policy.
3. DecTest(CT ′, (MJ , ρ̃), SKS̃)→ msg/⊥
Here MJ denotes the matrix composed of the rows belonging to J . Similarly
with [21] and [22], this function first computes a set I from MJ , where I denotes
the set of minimum subsets of J such that for each I∈I there exists ∑i∈I wiMi =





For authorized recipients with the right choice of ρ̃ and I, Ci and Dρ̃(i) are










Then, it generates key1 and key2 from key. After verifying that key2 is
correct, it can recover msg with the symmetric decryption algorithm under key1.
Otherwise, B is a random value in GT , so a random key2 will be derived,430
which cannot pass the validation process with a overwhelming probability. Thus
the function outputs ⊥.
Remarks. Since MJ is fixed during the DecTest phase, I only needs to be
calculated once. In addition, the paring results can be reused in different tests.
6. Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation435
6.1. Security Analysis
We analyze the security features of the proposed scheme from the perspec-
tives of data confidentiality and policy privacy.
• Data confidentiality The proposed construction is based on the under-
lying CP-ABE primitive in [15], which has been proved selectively CPA-440













will demonstrate that the modifications in our scheme do not affect the
data confidentiality. It can be seen the Setup and KeyGen algorithms
in our proposed scheme are the same with that in [15]. In addition, the
ciphertext generated from the Encrypt algorithm in our scheme has the445
similar structure with [15], except that an attribute Bloom filter T is in-
cluded. Note that, the attribute Bloom filter is derived only from the
access policy (M,ρ), which is public in [15]. Since no more information
in our scheme has been disclosed to the adversary compared with [15],
the advantages of the adversary to break the data confidentiality in our450
scheme is no more than that in [15]. Thus, based on the same security as-
sumption with [15], we can conclude that our scheme is able to guarantee
the data confidentiality.
• Policy privacy In our scheme, the attribute mapping function ρ is re-
moved from the access policy to prevent the leakage of attribute informa-455
tion. Additionally, a fuzzy attribute positioning algorithm is designed to
help the authorized recipients to decrypt the ciphertext. Following we will
show that the adversary (unauthorized recipients) cannot recover valuable
attribute information from the fuzzy attribute positioning algorithm. In
the fuzzy attribute positioning algorithm, the row number corresponding460
to each attribute in the access policy is inserted into the attribute Bloom
filter through the ABFBuild function. By calling the ABFQuery func-
tion, the adversary is allowed to query a row number for every attribute in
his attribute set. Furthermore, considering the dictionary attack, the ad-
versary can check all the system attributes. However, correct row numbers465
can be recovered only for those attributes belonging to the access policy,
while for others, a random row number is returned. Note that, the validity
of the row number for an attribute can only be verified through success-
ful decryption. Since the adversary cannot break the data confidentially,
even through colluding, nor can it identify the attribute mapping relation-470













attribute information in the access policy.
6.2. Performance Evaluation
We first give a comparison of our scheme and some other CP-ABE schemes
with LSSS-based access policy in the literature [15, 21, 22, 24], with respect to475
storage overhead and computation cost. Some related notions are clarified as
follows.
- |G|, |GT |, |Zp|: The bit-length of element in G, GT and Zp, respectively.
- |U |, |S|, l: The number of attributes in the system attribute universe, re-
cipient attribute set and access policy, respectively.480
- |M |, |(M,ρ)|, |h|,m: The bit-length of access matrix, access policy and
hash function, respectively.
- Ll, Latt: The bit-length of the value l and attribute string, respectively.
- k: The number of hash functions for the attribute Bloom filter.
- m: The size of the attribute Bloom filter.485
- XM,1: The number of elements in IM = {I1, . . . , IXM,1}, where IM means
the set of minimum subsets satisfying the access matrix M .
- XM,2: The total number of attributes in all the subsets of IM , i.e., |I1|+
· · ·+ |IXM,1 |.
- |P|: The number of elements in the set of attribute mapping functions P.490
- |J |: The number of rows used in the decryption.
- |I|: The number of attributes used during the final successful decryption.
Table 4 presents the sizes of the public key, master secret key, recipient secret
key and ciphertext (i.e., storage overhead). It demonstrates that our scheme
achieves attribute hiding only with few ciphertext storage overhead caused by495













Due to the small size of the value inserted into the Bloom filter, our scheme has
a better performance than [24]. Compared with [21] and [22] which apply the
LSSS-based access policy with multi-valued attributes, the size of the recipient
secret key in our scheme is much smaller. In addition, since the bit-length of500
the group element is much longer than that of l, our scheme can also save some
ciphertext storage space.
Table 4: Comparisons of storage overhead
Schemes Public Key Master Secret Key Recipient Secret Key Ciphertext
Basic CP-ABE [15] (2 + |U |)|G|+ |GT | |G| (2 + |S|)|G| |GT |+ (1 + l)|G|+ |(M,ρ)|
Lai et al. [21] (4 + |U |)|G|+ |GT | |U ||G|+ |Zp| (2 + |U |)|G| 2|GT |+ 4l|G|+ |(M,ρ)|
Cui et al. [22] 9|G|+ |GT |+ |h| |G|+ 4|Zp| (2 + 5|S|)|G| (3 + 6l)|G|+ |(M,ρ)|
Yang et al. [24] (2 + |U |)|G|+ |GT |+ k|h| |G| (2 + |S|)|G| |GT |+ (l + 1)|G|+ |M |+m(Ll + Latt)
Ours (2 + |U |)|G|+ |GT | |G| (2 + |S|)|G| |GT |+ (1 + l)|G|+ |M |+mLl + k|h|
Table 5: Comparisons of computation cost
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXSchemes
Operations Encryption Decryption
Multi Expo Pairing Hash Multi Expo Pairing Hash
Basic CP-ABE [15] l + 1 2l + 2 0 0 |I|+ 2 |I| 2|I|+ 1 0
Lai et al. [21] 6l + 2 8l + 4 0 0 ≤ XM,2 +XM,1 + |I|+ 2 ≤ |I|+XM,2 ≤ 2(1 + |I|+ |S|) 0
Cui et al. [22] 2l + 1 8l + 4 0 1 ≤ 5XM,2 + 2XM,1 ≤ XM,2 + 2XM,1 ≤ 6|S|+ 1 ≤ XM,1
Yang et al. [24] l + 1 2l + 2 0 k |I|+ 2 |I| 2|I|+ 1 k
Ours l + 1 2l + 2 0 k ≤ |S||J |+ 2|P|XMJ ,1 ≤ |P|XMJ ,2 ≤ |S|+ |J |+ 1 k
Table 5 shows the computing operations involved in the encryption and de-
cryption processes, in which only some time-consuming operations are consid-
ered, such as pairing, hashing and multiplication and exponentiation on groups.505
Considering the encryption process, our scheme only has some additional hash-
ing operations compared with the underlying CP-ABE scheme. Our scheme also
has a better performance compared with [21] and [22] in terms of the multipli-
cation and exponentiation operations. With regard to the decryption process,
since opportunistic decryption test is required in [21], [22] and our scheme, we510













subsets of attributes IM from M needs to be calculated before the decryption
test. While in our scheme, we compute IMJ from MJ , thus XMJ ,1 ≤ XM,1 and
XMJ ,2 ≤ XM,2. In addition, for the most time-consuming pairing operation,
our scheme has a significantly better performance. For the multiplication and515
exponentiation operations, although the cost in our scheme is affected by |P|,
the smaller XMJ ,1 and XMJ ,2 make them be completed efficiently.
Generally, taking into a comprehensive consideration of storage overhead,
computation cost and policy privacy, our scheme can achieve more effective
privacy preservation with a better overall performance.520
We simulate our scheme with python 3.5 on a notebook with an Intel Core
i7-7600U CPU at 2.80GHz and 16GB RAM running Ubuntu 18.04. Charm
framework (v0.5) is applied to implement the cryptographic operations from
the supporting of the PBC library (v0.5.14) and the OpenSSL library (v1.0.2).
We use the double hashing technology [35] based on the 128-bit MurmurHash525
and SpookyHash to construct the k hash functions of the attribute Bloom filter.
The numbers of attributes in the access policy and recipient attribute set are
both from 5 to 50. All the results are average running time in milliseconds of
50 trials.




































Figure 3: Computation time for ABFBuild and ABFQuery functions
Fig. 3 shows the running time of the ABFBuild and ABFQuery functions530





















































Figure 4: Computation time for Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms
In Fig. 3(a), 50 attributes can be inserted into the filter in less than 5ms, thus
in a worst case that the ABFBuild function fails, it can be completed with
the new parameters soon. In addition, it can be calculated that the ABFBuild
function has a negligible failure rate of 10−5 with k = 16, so we adopt k = 16535
in the subsequent simulations.
We simulate the encryption and decryption algorithms in our scheme on
the basis of four elliptic curves: SS512, MNT159, MNT201 and MNT2242,
which provide different security levels. Fig. 4 shows that the execution time
of encryption and decryption increases linearly with the number of attributes.540
The running time for building and querying the attribute Bloom filter is only
a tiny fraction of the total time for the encryption and decryption processes.
In addition, in our experiment, the decryption of a ciphertext containing 50
attributes can be completed in less than 400ms with a secret key of 50 attributes,
and the results are acceptable even with multiple decryption tests in practical545
applications.
2“SS” means the super singular curves (symmetric) and “MNT” is Miyaji, Nakabayashi,
Takano curves (asymmetric). The number after the type of the curve means the bit size of














In this paper, we have proposed a fine-grained data access control scheme
supporting expressive access policy with fully attribute hidden for cloud-based
IoT. We have designed a fuzzy attribute positioning mechanism based on gar-550
bled Bloom filter such that the authorized recipients are able to locate their
attributes to the access matrix and decrypt the ciphertext efficiently, while for
unauthorized recipients no valuable attribute information can be presumed. Our
scheme can achieve both data confidentiality and policy privacy preservation on
the basis of the underlying CP-ABE scheme. Numerical analysis and simulation555
results demonstrate that our scheme can achieve effective policy privacy preser-
vation with low storage and computation overhead. In the future work, we will
focus on how to decrease the number of decryption tests for the authorized re-
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